Following the massacre of Israelis in Hamas,” truthers” have spread two different types of conspiracy theories. The first type largely ignores the facts or denies an attack. People who merely despise Israel and support the terrorists make those arguments in blatantly poor faith. Any evidence that is presented to them is deemed falsified. The second type of conspiracy theory is the” inside job” variety, which frequently involves a” stand down” order that gave Hamas the freedom to execute more than 1,000 people without the use of force. Some of those pushing this material are the typical suspects, alt-righters, and anti-semite groups, while others are hairline Israelite figures and pro-war leftists who view every conflict as a massive conspiracy. Apart from being horrifying, it makes no sense that Prime Minister Netanyahu or senior generals would have issued a” stand down.” He had the longest tenure as prime minister in Jewish history prior to this attack. Polls indicate that the majority of Israelis want him to resign now that he has been forced to join a unity government. It’s possible that his political career is over. the same for the best generals. In Israel, they make a political transition. That is much less likely to occur right then. Despite their noble stature, Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan were tanked by the Yom Kippur War disaster. Allowing the enemy to kill more than a thousand of your people in an avoidable attack serves no social purpose. Israel is a little nation, to sum up. Many people are related to or friends with each other and are familiar with one another. According to this conspiracy theory, defense personnel who lived in these communities with friends and family chose to ignore calls for assistance and play cards while they were being butchered. In addition, they disregard attacks on their personal bases and consent to the murder, torture, and kidnapping of their own soldiers. But since it exists, let’s talk about it. How could this have happened given Israel’s strength and unparalleled security?
The majority of this” trutherism” asserts that the Hamas attack could not have occurred without some sort of complicity due to Israel’s superior security and robust intelligence system. I’m bad, no. Of all people, liberals should be aware that governments are ineffective. Israel’s security is impressive in comparison to that of the US because it makes an effort to secure things. But it’s far from being safe. The best proof of that is how frequently it has failed. Although Israel’s intelligence has received a lot of hype, it is primarily unpleasant intelligence. This indicates that it is fairly adept at identifying and eliminating enemy targets, as it currently does. At best, its protective intelligence has been a combined bag. Israel has a history of using intelligence to stop criminal attacks, which is only marginally better than ours. Ask a specific terrorist where they are, and they will likely be able to respond. If you ask where the future terrorist attack is coming from, the response will be no more helpful than our color-coded homeland security alerts. Typically, there is” chatter” and some” sources” say something, but” other sources” often say different things. After much deliberation, a higher-ranking analyst resolves the conflict. Israel was relying on passive intelligence gathering, sensors, and cameras rather than animal intelligence sources and people who were actually paying close attention to what was happening because they lacked boots on the ground. As I just wrote, during the Yom Kippur War fifty years ago, Israel came dangerously close to being destroyed because important intelligence figures refused to accept that an Egyptian attack was imminent despite receiving numerous warnings. That intelligence failure was worse and more unwarranted than this one. Intelligence and” intelligence” are not the same thing. Information is not always neatly packaged and bow-wrapped. People have to consider it and make judgments. They occasionally draw the right ones, but frequently they also sketch the bad ones. Additionally, there are a thousand pieces of information that they miss in addition to what they see. Does it make sense that Israel failed to make the Hamas preparations? such as missing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or Israel’s failure to defend itself in a way that would have preserved its Suez Canal position. Israel was aware of what was about to happen. A tiny security team was dispatched with the intention of apprehending five or seven attackers. Rather, it was overpowered by a massive assault that was exceptional and that no one anticipated. And that’s the true problem. Israel had indeed been sidetracked by months of communist riots. Additionally, it was the final day of the High Holy Days, a significant holiday. But most importantly, nobody had foreseen something of this magnitude happening. We now reach the next point as a result. 2. Why didn’t Israel intervene while Hamas was on the rampage for so much? Although estimates are still in the early stages, there are reports that Hamas sent 2,500 terrorists into Israel. For such a large-scale invasion, Israel had never been ready. It lacked the manpower necessary to react to it quickly and firmly. It’s a catastrophe that resulted from erroneous assumptions and inadequate planning. Here is an example of how devastatingly this unfolded in Kibbutz Be’eri, the scene of some of the worst murders. The Shaldag wealthy special forces unit’s commander, Lt. Col.” B,” was leading the charge to retake the peripheral Gaza Strip communities that Hamas had invaded since Saturday morning.
B claimed that on Shabbat, while at his parents’ house for Simchat Torah, he was awakened at 7 a.m. and informed of the invasion around 30 minutes later.
Shortly after, he and a few different units were flying north in helicopters toward the Gaza Strip corridor.
At 8:30 a.m., he claimed, the first Shaldag special forces units — 12 fighters — arrived at Kibbutz Be’eri and immediately began fighting to retake the city.
From the beginning, there was considerable fire from Hamas terrorists at the particular forces. As soon as some members of the special forces were killed or injured, the forces realized that the kibbutz was populated by terrorists. They had killed 20 Hamas terrorists after reorganizing and five hours of combat. According to other accounts, Shaldag was swiftly overrun by a larger number of terrorists — roughly 90 — inside. In any case, the statistics and the chaos speak for themselves. Many Shaldag reserve members had even arrived by 2 a.m. on Sunday, bringing the total number of special forces to 200, in addition to significantly more regular troops, paratroopers, and other special troops.
B claimed that, including his best deputy, on five of his forces were killed and 15 were injured.
B added that some of the leading commanders were killed or wounded because they were off duty and jumped right into the fray wherever it was, frequently without their full complement of forces, and that some soldiers who weren’t at a specific location where they should have been were attacked on their way.
In order to effectively rid Urim of terrorists and save a group of female soldiers who were trapped and surrounded, B related the story of an off-duty commander who fled toward the area where he believed the fighting to be taking place. He just so happened to come across some soldiers being trained to run standard training sources. This creates the most beautiful but terrible picture feasible. The size of an attack that no one was expecting caught the IDF off guard and prepared. It lacked the resources or organization to act fast. Would we fare no better if a million trained terrorists appeared at the border? The Likud’s culture and sports minister, Miki Zohar, extends an apology on behalf of the government to those who paid the ultimate price as well as the people who lived in the southwestern communities that Hamas massacred on Saturday.
” For an attack like this, the preparations were not in place. According to Zohar on Army Radio, the state and government were unprepared for such an attack.
We beg your pardon for what transpired in the name of the Israeli government and the entire State of Israel. There is nothing self-serving about saying that the preparations weren’t made because the responsibility rests with the Israeli government and the entire State of Israel. Blame will be dispersed. But hell, were we ready for a group of Saudis to fly box cutter-wielding hijackers into buildings? There will be protests and heads will roll because of the severe errors made here. However, this wasn’t a plot; rather, it was government negligence. Should there have been a quicker response if the attack had been anticipated? Without a doubt, yes. It’s a fatal failure of strategic planning as well as intelligence. It demonstrates the price of complacency, of playing defense, and of allowing terrorists to learn your tactics while assuming they won’t change their tactics. We can all learn something from this. In the wake of the attack, some people turn to conspiracy theories in an effort to understand what doesn’t seem to make sense. Israel was a victim of its own success despite spending decades projecting an image of excellent competence, beautiful intelligence, and daring operations. However, Israel is even the nation that performs best when on the offensive and, like most militaries, loses its creativity and staleness when forced to defend itself. Israel is a long way from being ideal. It has numerous failures and failings. This was a terrible situation. Some people need to believe that government is uber-competent and that its failures can only be explained by a conspiracy, not by the fact that governments are inherently incompetence. I’ve written extensively somewhere about these failings. How many times have Israeli soldiers been sent into battle against overwhelming numbers and firepower just to turn the tables with bravery and selflessness? much too frequently. Another one of those occasions was this one. Israelis are just as deserving of defense leadership as the men and women who fight on the front lines. Additionally, a defense leadership that would have anticipated this scenario was deserving of the victims. Unfortunately, they were not successful. Hopefully, they will the second time.
After the Hamas massacre, ‘truthers” have circulated two types of conspiracy theories. The first type essentially denies that there was an attack. The second kind nitpicks details. These arguments are made by people who hate Israel and support the terrorists. The second type of conspiracy theory is the “inside job”, which involves a “stand down order” that allowed Hamas massacre over 1,000 without any military intervention. Some of these people are alt-righters, anti-semites and libertarians. Others are anti-war leftists or libertarians that treat every war like a conspiracy. And some are fringe figures in Israel. He was the longest serving prime minister in Israeli History before this attack. He’s now forced to join a government of unity, and polls show most Israelis want his resignation. His political career could be over. The same is true for the top generals. In Israel, the generals transition into politics. The Yom Kippur War disaster ruined Golda Meir’s and Moshe Dayan’s careers, despite their heroic status. It’s not worth it to let the enemy kill over a 1000 of your people. Many people are related to each other or friends. This conspiracy theory demands that you believe that military personnel with friends and family in these communities chose to ignore calls for assistance and play cards while they were being murdered. Not to mention ignore attacks against their own bases, and allow their fellow soldiers to be murdered, abused, and taken as hostages.
Liberals should be the first to know that governments are incompetent. Israel’s security is better than the United States, because it tries to secure its citizens. It’s far from secure. Israel’s intelligence is often hyped, but it is mostly offensive intelligence. It’s good at what it does, which is to find out the locations of enemy targets. Its defensive intelligence is a mixed bag. Israel’s record of preventing terrorist attacks with intelligence is only slightly better than ours. There is usually a lot of ‘chatter’, and some sources’ will say one thing, while other sources will say another. Analysts examine it, and then someone in a higher position settles the argument. Without boots on the ground Israel relied on passive intelligence and sensors and cameras rather than human intelligence sources or people who were paying close attention to the situation. This was a more serious and unjustified intelligence failure. Intelligence is different from ‘intelligence’. Information is not always packaged in a neat package. Humans must look at the information and draw conclusions. Sometimes they draw conclusions that are correct, but often they are wrong. Does it make sense that Israel missed Hamas’s preparations? Israel knew that something was going to happen. It sent a small team of security personnel to intercept perhaps 5 or 7 attackers. It was instead overwhelmed by an unprecedented assault that no one could have predicted. And that’s what really matters. Yes, Israel was distracted by months of leftist protests. It was also the last day of High Holy Days, which is a time for celebration. This brings us to our second point. Why did Israel let Hamas rampage for so long without intervening?Estimates are still preliminary, but reports are that Hamas sent in 2,500 terrorists into Israel. Israel was not prepared for an attack of that magnitude. It didn’t have the manpower to respond quickly and decisively.
B reported that he was awakened at 7 am on Shabbat at his parents’ home for Simchat Torah, and told about the invasion 30 minutes after its start.
He and other units were soon in helicopters heading to the Gaza Strip corridor. They were also urging more units to go south.
He said that the first Shaldag Special Forces units, consisting of 12 fighters, arrived in Kibbutz Be’eri around 8:30 am and immediately began fighting to retake this kibbutz.
The terrorists of Hamas opened fire on the special forces right from the beginning. After five hours of fighting and reorganization, the special forces had killed 20 Hamas terrorists. Other accounts suggest that Shaldag quickly became overwhelmed by the superior number of terrorists inside, perhaps 90 or more. The numbers and chaos speak for themselves.
B claimed that five of his soldiers were killed and fifteen others wounded, including B’s top deputy.
B said that many soldiers who were not in a particular place that they were supposed to be were attacked as they were on their way. He added that some top commanders died or were wounded because they were off-duty and jumped into the fray where ever it was.
B told the story of a commander who was off duty and ran to where he thought there was fighting. He found a group who were being taught to run basic training sources and commandeered them. They were able to clean Urim from terrorists and rescue a group female soldiers who had been trapped and surrounded. This is a nice picture, but it’s a bad one. The IDF was caught off guard and unprepared by the magnitude of an attack no one expected. It lacked the manpower and organization to respond quickly. (Would we be able to respond better if a thousand armed terrorists arrived at the border?) Miki Zohar, Likud’s minister of culture and sports, apologizes on behalf of the Likud government to residents of the southern communities that were slaughtered on Saturday by Hamas and to those who suffered the ultimate cost.
“Preparations were not in place” for an attack such as this …. Zohar, on Army Radio, says that the government, or state, was not prepared for an attack such as this.
We ask for forgiveness in the name of Israel’s government and the entire State of Israel. The responsibility lies with the government of Israel, and the entire State of Israel. The blame will be shared. The errors here were catastrophic. There will be protests, and heads will roll. This wasn’t a plot, this was government incompetence. Should the attack have seen coming, and should there have a quicker response? It’s obvious that yes. This is a catastrophic failure of not only intelligence, but also strategic planning. It shows what happens when you become complacent and assume that terrorists won’t change their strategy. Some people, in the wake of an attack, try to make some sense of things that don’t make any sense by relying on conspiracy theories. Israel, who spent decades projecting a superior image of competence, brilliant intelligence and daring operations was a victim to its own success. Israel is a country that is best at offensive operations and, like many militaries, is stale and unimaginative when on defense. Israel is far from perfect. Israel’s failures are numerous. This was one of the worst. I’ve written extensively elsewhere about these failures. But some people still need to believe the government is uber competent and that its failures are only explained by a conspiracies, not the reality that governments have innate incompetence. Far too often. This was one of those times. Israelis deserve a leadership that is as good as those who serve on front lines. And the victims deserved military leadership who would have planned this scenario. Unfortunately, they didn’t receive it. Hopefully, the next time, they will.
